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C O P I E S  
OF SOME  
O F F I C I A L P A P E R S

CONCERNING THE  
PROCEEDINGS at MADRAS,

In September and October 1783.

IN RELATION TO

MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES STUART,  
Commanding in Chief His MAJESTY'S Forces in the EAST INDIES,  
and Commander in Chief of the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S  
Forces on the Coast of CHOROMANDEL.

AND SHEWING

The MARCH towards CUDDALORE, and the OPERATIONS of the MAIN ARMY  
under his Command, (April, May, June, and July, 1783.)

Printed 11th September 1784.





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## A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

**I**T has been thought proper by Major General James Stuart, that a faithful Copy should be printed of the *State of Facts and Proofs*, with the relative *Appendix*, which were officially delivered on the 10th day of October last, 1783, to Lord Macartney President, for Communication and Record to the Select Committee at Madras.

There are several reasons which have made it proper, that these Papers should now be printed.—One obvious reason is, that it will facilitate the task of those who, either from duty or inclination, may be disposed to investigate General Stuart's military conduct in the command of the army, with which he marched from Madras in the month of April, and with which he attacked the French Army at Cuddalore, in the month of June 1783.

Another reason is, that it will equally facilitate the task of those who, from similar motives of duty or inclination, may wish to examine the proceedings at Madras in the months of September and October 1783, for the purpose of discovering whether Major General Stuart, either in the situation of Commander in Chief of his Majesty's and of the East India Company's Forces in that part of India, or in the situation of a Member of the Council at Madras, or even in that of an individual Member of Society, had been guilty of any thing that merited the severities he experienced from the President and Members of that Select Committee; or whether, on the other hand, the Authors of these

severities have been guilty of an arbitrary and despotic use of their power, and of oppression and injustice to an individual, who had made every exertion in the service of his King and Country, and in the service of the Honourable East India Company, his employers.

The extraordinary measures taken by the Select Committee at Madras, in the months of September and October 1783, respecting Major General Stuart, are generally known; but the causes and motives of these measures have, by some means or other, been covered with an obscurity almost impenetrable.

For instance,—it is generally known, that on the 17th of September 1783, the President and Select Committee at Madras suddenly deprived Major General Stuart of the Command of the Forces of the East India Company, and even dismissed him altogether from that service: That they further assumed the power of dismissing him from the Command of his Majesty's Forces: That on the same day in which he was thus deprived of the Command of His Majesty's and of the Company's Forces; the Select Committee gave *the rank of Lieutenant General* in the Company's Service to *Colonel Lang*, who by that means claimed a right to command all the King's Officers then in India, and particularly got rank over *seven* Major Generals in the King's service, then actually in the Carnatic: That on the same 17th of September, within a few hours after they had thus dismissed Major General Stuart, they sent an armed force to seize him at his country-house, from whence he was forcibly taken, and lodged as a prisoner in his house within the Fort at Madras: That, thus deprived of his personal liberty, he was continued in a state of rigid confinement from the 17th day of September to the 14th day of October 1783: That on the 14th day of October he was compelled suddenly to leave India, having been that day, by means of an armed force, sent on board a vessel which the Select Committee had prepared on purpose for conveying him



## ADVERTISEMENT.

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to Europe, and in which vessel he was forcibly brought home to England.

These facts have been known in many quarters, being in themselves of a nature that could not easily be concealed.

But the causes and motives for seizing Major General Stuart by an armed force, for depriving him of his personal liberty, detaining him so long in a state of confinement, and finally forcing him to leave India, and repair to England,—these have been so carefully and industriously concealed, that General Stuart himself never was able, while in India, to learn on what grounds the Select Committee had proceeded, though he earnestly and often applied to them for that purpose.

With regard to the grounds on which the Select Committee proceeded in dismissing Major General Stuart from the Command of the Company's Troops, and from that Service altogether, the first information he received on that point, was from his being present in the Select Committee upon the 17th of September 1783, when Lord Macartney, without any previous intimation, produced and read in Council a long and elaborate Minute drawn up by himself, in which his Lordship was pleased to impute to General Stuart *Disobedience of Orders, Misconduct, &c.* The reading over that Minute was instantly followed by the dismissal of General Stuart from the Service, without giving him an opportunity to answer it, and without furnishing him, at that time, with any Copy of it, though much pressed for by him.

It was not till the 25th day of September, after Lord Macartney's Minute had produced its full effect, and when General Stuart was under confinement in the Fort at Madras, that he was, for the first time, supplied with a Copy of that Minute.

Under these circumstances, and in the period between the 25th of September and the 10th of October 1783, General Stuart, while a

prisoner in the Fort at Madras, drew up the *State of Facts and Proofs*, and the *Observations on Lord Macartney's Minute* of the 17th September, which form the following Collection of Papers now printed.

General Stuart was, at that time, not only deprived of the assistance of the persons he most needed, and of any communication with them, but had not, within his immediate reach, many of the essential Papers and Proofs which might have been proper to have been stated in answer to the President's Minute, and to which Papers he may possibly hereafter have occasion to refer.

If, therefore, either the State of Facts and Proofs should any where appear incomplete, or if any warm or inaccurate expressions on the part of General Stuart should be deemed liable to objection, he trusts that allowances will be made, on account of the distressing circumstances under which he drew up these Answers, and that some indulgence will be granted to the feelings of an Officer used in the manner that has been described.

General Stuart might, no doubt, have delayed giving in any Answers until he had got possession of all his materials, and until he was in a condition to avail himself of the benefit of able assistance; but he could not reconcile to his feelings, at that time, even a *temporary acquiescence*, under these Charges of *Disobedience of Orders*, and of *Misconduct*; and thought it better to state frankly, even to his accusers, such Answers as first presented themselves for refuting the imputations, than to wait coolly for a more convenient season for doing it more completely.

Another motive for his not delaying was, that he wished the first dispatches either to the Court of Directors, or to the Supreme Council in Bengal, should convey, along with Lord Macartney's Minute of the 17th of September, the Answers which he, General Stuart, had taken the first opportunity of giving in to that Minute, though unassisted in framing



framing and digesting this material Paper, which was drawn up under every possible difficulty and restraint, and with the disadvantage too of being confined in point of time; for, amongst other motives for his drawing up these Answers without delay, there was this, that he had a sanguine hope they might have the effect of making the Select Committee desist from their purpose of sending him forcibly to England.

If, from these circumstances, the Papers thus given in to the Select Committee at Madras should not be thought sufficiently complete, or if they should appear to others not so satisfactory as General Stuart, from his own conviction, hopes and believes they will, he thinks it proper to declare, that in consequence of his having of late had time and opportunity to collect and arrange his Papers, he has it now in his power to produce a much more complete State of Facts and Proofs for refuting the aspersions or imputations contained in the President's Minute of the 17th September; but as the persons, from whom these charges against his conduct proceeded, are not at present in Great Britain, he will not permit himself *now* to introduce any new matter not specified or referred to in the Papers he delivered in to the Select Committee while on the spot at Madras.

He has therefore, in the Papers now printed, confined himself carefully and entirely to the Facts and Proofs which were given in to the Select Committee at Madras, and which have been transmitted both to the Supreme Council in Bengal, and to the Court of Directors in England.

The Papers which form this printed Collection, are merely faithful copies (without addition or comment) of Lord Macartney's Minute of the 17th of September 1783, with General Stuart's Answers to it, which were written partly on the Margin of a Copy of the Minute itself, and other parts of the Answers were contained in a Paper titled *State of Facts and Proofs*, given in at the same time to the Select Committee;

mittee ; because that Minute and these Answers are become official Papers, the authenticity of which cannot be disputed.

The date when General Stuart's Answers, under the title of *State of Facts and Proofs*, were sent to Lord Macartney and the other Members of the Select Committee, and the object of sending them, will appear from the following exact Copy of General Stuart's Letter addressed to them, dated the 10th of October 1783.



LETTER FROM MAJOR GENERAL STUART, &c.  
essential accompanying Papers, be delivered certainly into the hands of the day before noon.

COPY of a LETTER from Major General  
STUART to Lord MACARTNEY, President,  
&c. Select Committee, Madras.

My LORD, &c.

I N presenting to you, as I now do, the State of Facts and Proofs in Two Parts, from page 1 to 42\*, and the Appendix, from page 1 to 15\*, and Index, I act more ingenuously and fairly towards you, than your Lordship, &c. have done to me, from whom you have kept back every communication (upon such material personal concerns) which you have been pleased to transmit either to the Honourable the Court of Directors, or to the Board of Bengal.

But as I had promised to you, in some of my letters, if I lived a few days, to overturn the baseless fabric of the Right Honourable President's Minute September 17th, so I thought it proper thus religiously to keep my word.

Take all this advantage, only let me be assured that this *State of Facts and Appendix*, now communicated to your Lordship, &c. shall be transmitted to the Honourable Court of Directors, and to the Board of Bengal, by the next dispatches—I will in that confidence appeal to these Papers.

And as in the delivering, as I did, *my Declaration and Protest*, under cover, to the Select Committee on the 7th instant in the forenoon, into the hands of the Right Honourable President by my friend Mr. Close, so I shall in like manner take care that this Letter, and the

\* These Numbers refer to the Pages of the written Copy.

x LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL STUART, &c.

essential accompanying Papers, be delivered certainly into the same hands this day before noon.

I have the honour to be,

My LORD, &c.

Fort St. George,  
October 10th, 1783.

Your most obedient and  
most humble Servant,

(Signed) JAMES STUART.

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The preceding is the Copy of the Letter delivered by Mr. Close to Lord Macartney at noon, on the 10th; at the same time he delivered the Papers entitled, "State of Facts, and Appendix."

(Signed) J. S.



*To the Right Honourable GEORGE Lord MACARTNEY, K. B.  
President and Governor, &c. Select Committee, Fort St. George.*

## STATE of FACTS and PROOFS,

TO SHEW

The Injustice and Illegality of the Proceedings in Select Committee, held, Fort St. George, Sept. 17, 1783, and subsequently from that Time, towards me,

(Signed) JAM<sup>s</sup> STUART.

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### PART FIRST.

**O**BSERVING, as I do, that the General Orders of the Select Committee, published September 17th, declaratory of their having dismissed me from the Honourable Company's service (which act I maintain to be an assumption of power, without either right or reason on their part), do refer to former General Orders published on the 19th of last March to the army then under my command; it becomes, therefore, necessary for me to state the cause of these General Orders.

I will present the indisputable facts; and leave to others to judge of the spirit that has uniformly pervaded and actuated the proceedings towards me, and which now operates. The matter, then, literally stands thus: When I was on service with the army on the march to and from Vellore, in the month of March last, it was signified in a note, as I believe,

lieve, from Mr. Secretary Huddleston to Mr. Welch the Paymaster (but not in form of an Order to me), that a certain sum of money (12,000 Pagodas), as stoppages *already* made by the Commissary Mr. Jackson, and in his (Mr. W.'s) hands, was to be paid to the Bullock *Mastries*.

Part of this money was issued for the purpose, without my thinking more of it, otherwise than as I always did, to take care that a certain sum should ever be in the army-chest to pay the Europeans subsistence, in preference to every thing. Much about the same time (or rather some time after), the Select Committee sent *their* Orders to publish to the army *their* appointment of Mr. Huddleston to be Judge Advocate General to the army; the Commander in Chief in India, Sir Eyre Coote, being at the time absent in Bengal, and his warrant to another Gentleman (Mr. Richard Sullivan) still in force, and no orders to the contrary received from his Excellency.

I obeyed Government literally in publishing *their* Orders as above; it was my Public Duty.

But I wrote, in consequence, to them two Letters, on the 14th and 15th of March, as I believe, to which I beg leave to refer.

The Select Committee, while I was absent on duty, but within three hours drive of the Presidency, met in consultation \* upon the contents of these letters of mine; found fault with them; accused me of disobedience of Orders in not ordering the Bullock *Mastries* money; and highly resenting my refusal to give a separate sanction to their appointment of Mr. Huddleston, as the Judge Advocate to the army, without the previous authority of Sir Eyre Coote. I beg leave to refer to my Letters, and to their Proceedings in Committee March 19th.

The Select Committee, as I guess, by way of Military Discipline on their part, sent their General Orders, March 19th (now alluded to), to publish to the army the agreement I had signed in England July 4th, 1777, the same as is required of all the Company's Military Officers;

\* March 19, 1783.

namely,



namely, to be subject to the Civil Government; and that, in effect, the ceremony of a Court Martial may be dispensed with.

There was also a separate Letter, or General Order, accompanying, to shew the army, that the whole was pointed at me. It is absolutely out of my power *now* to furnish copies of all these papers; but they are of universal notoriety, on record, and in the Orderly Books of the army; and transmitted home in quadruplicate, as I believe, for reference to the Court of Directors.

Suffice it to observe, in my own vindication, that all these General Orders, with the copy of the paper signed in England, and the accompanying General Orders, or Letter of Government, however humiliating in the extreme to me, who commanded the army (King's and Company's troops), were, literally and instantly, by my orders, issued to that very army.

But having done so, I thought I owed it to myself, as a member of Government, to lay before them, in a Letter or Minute, March 21st, my sentiments, with the real state of facts. I shall here refer to that very Letter \*, copied at full length; leaving it to others to judge of the degree of necessity there was to impose upon me the humiliating task of publishing to the army such pointed reflections upon such grounds.

These two acts of imputed disobedience are, as I think, totally devoid of foundation or proof.

As to the Bullock Maftries stoppages, with which I had no connection, it clearly appears, that the Select Committee did not know what they were writing about; and, I believe, they were sensible, though too late, of their mistake; and I never heard more of it.

But as to the appointment of the Judge Advocate, on which such stress is laid, I must here beg leave to point out a most remarkable circumstance indeed, which was, at the time above mentioned, unknown to me (being then on service), and by chance found out on inspection of the Records.

The Select Committee, as above, blame me for expressions in my Letters relative to the appointment of the Judge Advocate: this they do

\* See Appendix, N° I.

on the 20th March, when, to their certain knowledge at the time, they themselves had, near six weeks before, in consultation, settled a paragraph \* of their General Letter to the Court of Directors on this subject, evidently shewing, that the appointment was, *in fact, in the Commander in Chief*, who continued Mr. Richard Sullivan in that station, distinct from the office of the Company's Military Secretary. This Gentleman, Mr. Sullivan, was at the time (March 20th) in that office. I refer to this paragraph in the Note, and leave the comment to others: but, more particularly, beg leave to call upon the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and the Honourable Court of Directors, to judge under what colour or pretence I can be said to have disobeyed the Orders of Government in this business?

To shew the ideas of his Excellency Sir Eyre Coote concerning his legal powers in this respect, I shall also transcribe the parts of his † Letter, received a few months before the period alluded to.

And, lastly, in point of the legality of such powers, I am to appeal to the Royal Warrant to Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, *or the Officer commanding his Majesty's troops in India*; the original whereof has been

\* *Extract from Consultations in Select Committee, 5th of Feb. 1783.*

“ In answer to this 9th paragraph, General Letter, 29th of August 1782, it will be proper to inform the Honourable Court of Directors, that all General Courts Martial are, at present, held under the sole authority of the King's Commander in Chief, and considered by him as subject only to his approval or disapproval: also, that *he considers the appointment of the Judge Advocate General as vested in him; and accordingly appointed Mr. Richard Sullivan to that station, and continued him in it after he had resigned the Secretaryship, to which it would still have been always annexed.*”

† *Extract of the Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to me, dated Calcutta, Dec. 1, 1782.*

“ In enumerating the several matters which you say you had sent as memorandums to his Lordship, you mention, that of *impowering and instructing the Judge Advocate to proceed in the trial of Captain Bonnevaux, &c.* I presume you can mean no more than for the Government (who, I suppose, is the prosecutor) to deliver to the Judge Advocate the charges upon which the officers were to be tried, as he is already sufficiently empowered by the tenor of his appointment from myself, or from my delegates, to proceed in every prosecution which may be brought before that Court at which he officiates, and without being furnished with any particular instructions.”



by me transmitted to this Government (September), in order to make a copy for the records, and to Bengal.

After saying thus much, and referring to the proof, I trust and hope that there remains not a doubt of my being *wrongfully* accused of disobedience of the Orders of Government, in the instances which gave rise to the publication of the General Orders, March 19, 1783.

Arbitrary and despotic as the powers may be which are given to the Government to dismiss the Company's Military Officers without a Court Martial, yet I do not recollect of their ever having been used.

In policy, as well as in common regard to the feelings of gentlemen, such powers should not be brought forward to the public view upon frivolous or ill-founded reasons. I make no distinction, in this case, betwixt the *feelings of the General commanding*, and those of the youngest Ensign in the army; and every man in the Company's service felt more or less when these Orders, March 19th, were issued.

But whatever may be the powers of the Select Committee over the Military Officers in the Company's service in general, I maintain that the Commander in Chief of their forces on this establishment (which I am) is excepted, as a Member of the Select Committee; and that the powers of the majority of that Committee do not extend to the suspension, and much less to the dismissal, of any Member once appointed, or succeeding to a seat in the Committee, before the case is stated to, and the orders received from, the Honourable the Court of Directors.

I desire to appeal to the Company's General Letter, January 11, 1783; and to the other instructions establishing the constitution of the present Government.

On this ground might I rest the argument, were I even in fault in any one point of conduct. But as I have here done in the two preceding instances, so in every other allegation, or assertion, or reasoning of the Select Committee to my prejudice, I now undertake to prove, in what follows, not only that I am blameless, but I venture further boldly and unambiguously

ambiguously to foretel, that my conduct will be approved of by those who have the best right to decide upon the merits: and to this end, I shall take a wider range in stating my conduct in the command of the army from April 1783, when it marched from this neighbourhood, to July 1783, when this very Select Committee thought proper, under every humiliating circumstance in their power, to recal me to the Presidency.

But first, I am to premise, chiefly for the information of the Government of Bengal, and of the Honourable Court of Directors, that on Thursday the 25th of September, at half past two in the afternoon, I was, for the first time, furnished with the copy of that very Minute of the President (in Committee, September 17th \*), which of a sudden, and without any previous warning to me, or any specific charge, was brought forward by him that day, and afterwards instantly followed by *his* motion; and both implicitly and literally adopted by the voices of Messrs. Sadlier, Davidson, and Williams, no less indeed than *to dismiss me from the Honourable Company's service*. It passed in an instant, without its availing me at the time, with the greatest earnestness, to request of them to suspend their decision, until I could have a copy of the Minute, and to make answer, which should not be delayed.

It was carried against me; and after being so carried, I was permitted to give in a Paper †, with a few words in haste, stating my sense of such unwarrantable proceedings; an official copy of which Paper has not been sent me.

It appears then, that, notwithstanding of my request on the 17th September, and repeated in several Letters since, full nine days (in my present close confinement) have passed, without my being furnished with the copy of the Minute on which they ground their proceedings.

It is to be also observed, that this communication was not made, until all the Company's ships were sailed from Bengal, without acquainting of

\* See Appendix, N° V. where an exact Copy of the Minute of 17 Sept. is inserted.

† See Appendix, N° VI.



what they had wrote concerning me to that Government, and also within six days of the fleet sailing for Europe. Deprived of every assistance, but of one Portuguese writer, and *of every communication or conversation with the living witnesses of my conduct*, no person being admitted without the leave of the Select Committee, and in the presence of the officer on duty in my room.

This digression seemed to me necessary, both to shew my present situation, and the difficulties I have to struggle with, and to account for the inaccuracy of this General Defence of my conduct.

The General Orders to the whole army (King's and Company's troops) were issued by the Select Committee about one in the afternoon, while I was yet in the Committee room. I went to my country house about three: and in a short time after Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, the Adjutant General of the Company's forces on this establishment communicated to me those General Orders; and I told that Gentleman to do his duty.

Major General Sir John Burgoyne was then at table with me, and saw what passed: I shewed to him a copy of the Orders, and he soon after went to the fort.

In the evening\* of the same day, between six and seven, I was, by the Fort Adjutant, Lieutenant Gomond, and by George Leonard Staunton (for such he told me loudly was his name), backed both of them with an armed force of Sepoys, in the upper room of my house, seized suddenly, and forcibly brought from thence to the house in the fort, where I now am kept in the closest confinement, with an officer constantly present on duty; my doors open to him and by the Committee's Orders at pleasure.

In this situation, and *late* hour of information concerning what has been alledged against me, and which is now *only* to be collected from this Minute of the President adopted by the majority; and under every diffi-

\* See Affidavit of Major Grattan, Appendix, N<sup>o</sup> VII.

culty which disingenuous ingenuity can devise, to deprive me of the means to do myself *timely* justice—I am now to disprove the assertions contained in that Minute, applicable to any possible *fair* construction of disobedience on my part to the Orders of Government, on any occasion whatever. I trust I shall be able to do it; and even at all times when called upon, to vindicate myself from any want of conduct, of prudence, of judgment, or of proper exertion in my station, as the *General* intrusted with the chief command of the army; but more particularly at the time now alluded to, during the period from *April* to *July* last.

In order, however, to remove an immensity of extraneous matter, which has, with industrious art, and not with the best design, been thrown into this Minute or Charge, if I may so call it, *civilly* speaking; I need only state, that in regard to my opinions in Committee on the public business before and after Hyder's death, and the state of the army at those times, with a multiplicity of other points, where it was my fortune to differ in opinion with the President, and often with the majority; and particularly my opinions concerning the nature of the command of his Majesty's troops, uniformly consonant to the opinion of the late Commander in Chief, and conformable to his Letters and Instructions to me as my Military Superior in that station; all I need now say is to repeat, that this and all former business has been, for months past, referred home, according to the custom of the service; and their decision must be in duty waited for by their servants. As to many of the points in this very Minute of September 17th, the Company's answers may be looked for to arrive in the course of a few weeks.

It remains, then, *only* to be shewn, in this most singular mode of proceeding towards me, a collection of topics, opinions, general assertions, and subjects that have at least two points of view to be seen in, debated and referred in duplicate home; yet upon the whole farrago, it is now made the cause of proceeding to the most severe, as well as the most sudden decision ever heard of, applicable to the total situation of any person



person employed, either Civil or Military, in the Honourable Company's service.

On this account, and for the above reasons, I do not think myself called upon; and, I hope, in the opinion of my superiors, it will not be thought necessary to go over that old ground; and I shall, therefore, leave the whole to its own merits in *England*.

My object in what follows is, not only to clear myself from every imputation of disobedience to the orders of Government, but to establish proofs of merit and good conduct in the command of the army, from *April* to *July*, and during the time I remained with the field army, until the proper opportunity offered to convey me to the Presidency by the *Medea* frigate, July 13.

Here I must observe, as on other matters brought forward by the President's Minute, that every original voucher relative to the operations of the army in the interval mentioned, and every letter, almost daily written by me to Government, has already gone home in duplicate to the Honourable Court of Directors, by the Pondicherry armed transport, and by the *Medea* frigate; and as no new matter had occurred, it never once occurred to me, that, in the matters I am now to treat of (*but not with one-third of the materials*), I was to be expected to find materials to answer a personal charge, even although the decision of the Committee had been deferred until that answer had been given.

The matter has been decided by the Select Committee without my answer; yet I think myself called on to expose their *hasty* decision, to give it *now* the mildest term, by bringing forward even the third part of the materials and proofs which *were*, and *are*, under *their* eyes, at the time of giving such an *unjust* sentence—I cannot mince the matter!

What I have now to adduce is chiefly for the immediate information of the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and the Court of Directors, and to guard them against partial information, as I am not acquainted with what this Government writes to either, I, therefore, do not think myself obliged, through them, to communicate to either,

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though I may, perhaps, some time hence, give a copy for the records here.

I shall refer to facts and dates, and desire neither favour or prejudice to support my deductions. The whole of my correspondence, as I have been told, is officially gone to England and to Bengal, with every proof and voucher to support. I shall beg leave *to refer to the Original Letters*, and not to trust to my quotations, where, very possibly, there may be error in dates, as well as in substance. I trust, and hope they will attribute such error to press and hurry of time from this *very late* communication, and the difficulties in my way on the part of this Government, and to the want of means to copy and correct. I say, I trust to their candour, that they will not think it proceeding from premeditated wilful design, as in the alleged acts of disobedience in this President's Minute, Sept. 17th; but, on the contrary, believe, as in truth, both in *representation* and in *action*, that the real motives of my conduct were, the advantage of the Honourable Company, the good of the general service, duty to my Sovereign, to the state of Britain, and to my own honour, altogether uninfluenced by *improper* ambition, or attention to personal advantages.

(Signed) JAM<sup>s</sup>. STUART.



## PART SECOND.

## Co-operation of the Southern Army under Colonel Lang, as settled in Committee, held April 17, 1783.

## OBSERVATIONS.

*I Have myself copied from the Minutes of Consultation, as on the other side. I request attention to be paid to it, because whatever letters may have been written to me or Colonel Fullarton, or Colonel Lang, or from me to them, this is the true text; and no supposed commentary, even by official letters, should have weight, until compared with this Minute.*

*See my letters\*, not official, to Colonel Lang, as far back as March, on this very subject. The protracting of the operations after the Army left the Presidency, was entirely owing to the delay of the ships not arriving at Conjamere [until May 13, and of the necessary reinforcements of troops, with the provision and store-ships, under convoy of Captain Haliday, with the Isis, &c. not arriving at their destination south of Cuddalore, until June 6, 1783]—a delay which I did not suppose in my calculation of the march to Cuddalore.*

*In this Committee, April 17th, my Plan of Operations, April 8th, was read—I beg leave to refer† to it particularly.*

*Extracts from the Minutes in Committee, April 17, 1783.*

“THE General earnestly recommends to the Committee the empowering him to order Colonel Lang to join the main army with the principal part of the Southern army, in order to reduce, in a very short time, the French force at Cuddalore; and declares it as his opinion, that the junction is necessary to make sure of that important object.

“The President, in answer, reminds the General of the important service on which Colonel Lang’s army is now employed against the enemy’s possessions towards the Coimbatore country, encouraging the disaffected there, and creating a diversion in favour of General Matthews, who, without such diversion, will be unable to make head against the force opposed to him.

“General Stuart repeats his opinion as before expressed; and the Committee agreeing with him, that one great object is the speedily obtaining possession of Cuddalore, and the

\* Namely, my Letter to Col. Lang, March 26 and 31, in the subjoined Appendix, No. II. and IV.—and to Col. Lang, April 18-20, in The Correspondence with Select Committee, p. 11 and 12. J. S. 1784.

† In the hurry and difficulty of copying from the original paper (which my situation in October 1783 will account for), the words (enclosed as above) were omitted to be transcribed, as appears evidently from the sense and connection. I have therefore now taken leave to add those words. J. S. 1784.

† See Correspondence with Select Committee, from page 3 to 9.

J. S. 1784.

“ French force there; as the General  
 “ thinks for the attainment of it, the  
 “ junction of the *main part* of Colonel  
 “ Lang’s army will be *indispensably*  
 “ *necessary*, the Committee empower  
 “ him to send orders to Colonel Lang  
 “ for that purpose; the General as-  
 “ suring them that he will leave such  
 “ a force to the southward, as *he* shall  
 “ be convinced will be sufficient to  
 “ maintain our footing there, to give  
 “ protection to those who may have  
 “ declared in our favour, and even to  
 “ act offensively, and as much as  
 “ possible to assist General Matthews.”

✉ LETTERS from Major General  
 STUART, to which Reference is made.

† To the Admiral. April 19, 1783.

\* *Abstract of the Contents of these*  
 LETTERS.

STATES my idea that the best mode  
 to co-operate by sea with the army,  
 would be, to keep Monsieur Suffrein in  
 view; and requesting to take the pro-  
 vision and store ships in tow as far as  
 Cuddalore, and then leave them with  
 the Isis and the frigates he could spare.

To the Select Committee. April 20.

Wrote immediately after joining the  
 army from the Presidency, stating  
 very particularly the whole means of  
 carriage with the army, and what was  
 consequently to be expected.

To Colonel Lang, com- April 20.  
 manding the army  
 South of the Coleroon.

Giving accounts of the resolution in  
 Committee, that the army to the  
 southward was to co-operate with me;  
 and the manner.

*This letter is of importance, and there-  
 fore it is to be compared with the resolu-  
 tion in Committee, April 17th, concerning  
 the co-operation; because it is alleged that  
 I have acted contrary to that resolution.*

✉ On the 19th of April 1783, in the evening, I left Madras, and joined the army at Taumarum next morning  
 —An account is here given of part of my Correspondence from that date to the time of my leaving the army in  
 July 1783. J. S. 1784.

• See at large the whole of the Letters on both sides, in The Correspondence with the Select Committee  
 of Fort St. George, in this Collection. J. S. 1784.

† See this and every Letter To and From the Admiral, in The Correspondence with Vice Admiral Sir  
 Edward Hughes, K. B. in this Collection. J. S. 1784.



## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

To the Select Committee. April 22.

*In this Letter I sent the return, to shew that there were only the means of fourteen days carriage of rice for the army; and that the sickness of the European brigade would oblige to halt near the Palar for a day or two.*

To the Admiral. April 22.

To the Select Committee. April 23.

To Lieutenant Colonel Elphinstone. April 23.

To the Select Committee. April 24.

*The Select Committee never once made me an answer to this letter; and until my return from the army, the middle of July, I did not know otherways than that the garrison at Pollicate, at least, had been supplied frequently from this rice there in store; but on the contrary, it was not so, and the rice for the garrison was sent from Madras to that place at public charge. Since my return, in order at once to put an end to this business, I requested it might be received in measure-*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Represents the state of the army, and the means of carriage. Indent for what is wanted, and to be sent by the ships under convoy of the Ifis. I desire that the Company's servants to the southward be empowered to provide what they can for the army.

Acquaints of the situation of the army, and intended disposition in advancing.

Informs, sickness of the Europeans, and sends the return of the Surgeon Major. Determine to halt them, and to send forward the second line. The Madras Coolies, after one trip with rice only to Chingleput, or the greater part run off, and no service derived from them.

Acquaints of my plan to deposit the rice, for which we had not means of carriage, in posts as we advance; and give instructions for the possession of Permacoil.

This letter, though on separate business which concerns my private fortune, will shew the very little attention paid to me by the Select Committee in a request which might have served the Public, and relieved me from the inconvenience I now experience, in consequence of a public exertion on my part in time of the greatest calamity of this settlement with the greatest probability of famine, at the risk of my private fortune and with infinite trouble, as it has now turned out, by the loss of every fort during

## STATE OF FACTS AND PROOFS.

## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

*ment, what was good, without payment, as I should trust to the Board of Bengal for that.—Even this request was refused. See Proceedings in Committee.*

To Colonel Pearce. April 25.

To Colonel Gordon. April 25.

To Colonel Gordon. April 25.

To the Deputy Agent Mr. Kenworthy. April 25.

To Colonel Gordon. April 26.

To Colonel Gordon. April 26.

The official return of the quantity of rice, and means of carriage with the army, signed by Captain Hearsey, Military Grain Keeper. April 26.

*Observe, that in the whole of my experience I have ever found that in five days movement of the army, one-fourth part is in one way or other embezzled or lost.*

To Colonel Fullarton. April  $\frac{27}{28}$ .

*This letter is particularly to be attended to, as it will shew the precise plan I*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

the four months of uncertainty, owing to the receiving no answer to this letter.

Instructions to put himself and his brigade at Madranticum, and to cover and assist the convoys of rice, &c. in communication betwixt Permacoil and Chingleput.

To take the carriage loaded to Atcherywauk with two brigades; and, relative to Permacoil.

Ordering to send back the army carriage from Atcherywauk, after depositing the rice, so as on the return, it might proceed from Chingleput with the first brigade.

Shewing my opinion of the low state of the carriage cattle.

Relates to Permacoil and the rice, with his detachment.

The alarming low state of the carriage cattle and loss by death; and concerning Permacoil.

To shew our utmost possible means of carriage to be depended upon in our move with the army, and therefore evincing the necessity of depositing, what we could not carry, in secure posts, and to be sent for backwards.

Acquaints of the death of Sir Eyre Coote—The state of the army—The object of the campaign—Gives him my opinion how the force to the southward



## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

*meant to follow in the co-operation, and gave Colonel Fullarton sufficient knowledge of it, to be in readiness to have moved towards me in proper time. I beg to refer back to the first note to Colonel Lang, stating the distribution of the force. Colonel Lang succeeded and carried Carrour and Dindigul. He was recalled, and returned to the Presidency, on account of health. Still the co-operation was to be carried on; and to this effect I write to Colonel Fullarton. The force he was to bring with him made it more honourable to come with that reinforcement, considering the small force that could be kept out of garrison to the Southward. In all events my views were clearly expressed, and, as I thought, and yet think, exactly according to the orders of Government.*

To the Select Committee. April 27.

To the Select Committee. April 28.

To Colonel Lang, or the Officer commanding to the Southward. April 28.

*This letter is very necessary to be attended to, to shew I meant no concealment, but plainly to say what I expected;*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

should be employed until I sent him more particular orders—States the great object where I saw the southern force might be useful in the intended co-operation—Expresses my wish that he (Colonel Fullarton) do not abandon any present enterprize on receiving my information of what was expected, such as that of Dindigul, at which place he was; but that he afterwards was to move towards the Coleroon, and co-operate with me in the greatest of all national objects—the extinguishing the French and their influence in India; and that I had wrote to Colonel Lang to the same purpose.

Very full on the state of the army carriage, and the manner I proposed to get forward—Permacoil taken possession of—The disposition of the army—The first report of the loss of Bidinore.

Shews the plan I meant to follow in proceeding to the southward, and what would be wanted from the Presidency—Sir Eyre Coote's death, my determination to conform to the orders of government.

I enclose to him a duplicate of the orders of the Select Committee concerning the co-operation proposed, and referring him to my letter to Colonel Fullarton, of April 27-28. See above.

## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

*and give full time to Colonel Fullarton or Colonel Lang to prepare as I advanced.*

To the Select Committee. April 29.

Informing of my moving towards Permacoil, in expectation of seeing from thence the Active frigate, Captain Troubridge, and the Resolution transport, at Conjamere.

To Colonel Fullarton. May 1.  
And postscript.

Acquainting that officer of my wish and plan concerning the southern operation.

To the Select Committee. May 5.

*It is worth notice, that the Select Committee have never once given me the smallest merit, or ever mentioned, in their letters, any service done by me at Permacoil.*

Anxiously looking for the Active frigate, Captain Troubridge, and the Resolution transport, to arrive at Conjamere; and acquainting of having wrote to Colonel Fullarton—Permacoil taken possession of, and putting in a tenable state.

To Mr. Sullivan.  
And P. S.

May 5.  
6.

To desire he will open the letters directed to Colonel Fullarton, and be informed of my plan of co-operation to the southward; and that the movements of the army at the time of writing turned upon the arrival of the ships, and the landing of the rice at Conjamere.

To Colonel Pearce.

May 7.

Informing of the necessity to send from Permacoil back to Chingleput the carriage of the army, to bring rice from thence (Chingleput) in advance to the army, as the ships were not then arrived at Conjamere, and the disposition accordingly.

To Mr. Tanner, Paymaster and Grain-keeper at Chingleput.

May 7.

On the preceding subject.

To the Select Committee. May 8.

*N. B. This letter is of the first consequence to shew the real state of the army,*

Treats very fully on the situation of affairs, and of the necessity at every risk to the carriage cattle to send the



## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

*and the true cause of what is unjustly insinuated as delay. In this letter I gave the intelligence of Mons. Suffrein's plan, at all risks to fight his way to Cuddalore.*

To the Select Committee. May 11.

To the Select Committee. May 14.

To the Select Committee. May 14.

To Captain Muirhead, May 15.  
commanding the debarkation at Conjamere.

To Captain Muirhead. May 16.

To Captain Muirhead. May 17.

To Captain Troubridge. May 17.

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

whole back with the public followers to Chingleput; the army a dead mass till they return; that this necessary measure palpably evinced the prudent precaution to have filled the stores at Chingleput by the three convoys sent there, and which returned to camp before the army marched the 21st of April.

In answer to suspicions concerning my correspondence with Colonel Lang, or Colonel Fullarton, concerning the Southern co-operation, and to shew why from reason, inclination, and duty, I chose to obey the orders of government.

To inform of the arrival of the Active frigate, Captain Troubridge, and Resolution transport being arrived at Conjamere; and the movement of the army towards Killanoor in consequence.

Acquainting of Captain Troubridge's assurances to expedite the service at Conjamere; and to inform of his having seen the admiral.

Instructions how to proceed in the care of the rice, and forwarding the service.

Instructions and letter on the same.

Ditto, and to prevent embezzlement of rice.

Requesting to forward a letter to the Admiral; and to forward the landing of the rice.

## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

To the Select Committee. May 18.

*In this letter, which shews the uniformity of my plan, I informed Government of the force under Seyd Sabib being ordered from the Tanjore Country to assemble round Cuddalore.*

To Captain Muirhead. May 18.

To Mr. Sullivan. May 22.

To Captain Muirhead. May 23.

N. B. *There are letters daily and on record from the first to last on this subject, that no time was lost.*

To the Honourable Mr. Cochrane, Resident at Negapatam, Assistant to the Resident at Tanjore. May 23.

*In this letter I mention my determination to leave the rice at Conjamere, the instant I know of the Isis and convoy being at their station South of Cuddalore.*

To the Select Committee. May 24.

To the Select Committee. May 24.

*In this letter I request to know if any orders, unknown to me, had been sent to*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Acquaints of the utmost powers to land daily at Conjamere, and of the necessity to send back the army carriage to Permacoil to bring the rice from thence, and to deposit what we could not carry in one move at Killanoor (which I made a post of) and to Villanoor, which I intended to make, and thus to proceed forward on sure ground, whatever may be the reports of the necessitous state of the French at Cuddalore.

Concerning the debarkation of the rice, and to expedite the service.

Acquainting of the time when the rice will be landed at Conjamere, and that the army will march immediately thereafter.

A letter to him from Captain Troubridge of the Active, giving the reasons why the rice could not be more quickly landed.

To acquaint him of the situation of the army, the proposed movements, and the precautions necessary to be taken to prevent the rice and other provisions coming from the southward from falling into the enemy's hands—Informs of the secret being *with me only* in what precise route the army was to move to our last ground to be taken up before Cuddalore.

Informs of the progress and finishing of the landing at Conjamere.

Acquaints of having received a letter, dated May 12th, from Colonel Fullarton, commanding south of the



## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

*Colonel Fullarton; and I state the reasons why that force will be wanted at Cuddalore in every point of view.*

This letter very essential in the chain.

To the Select Committee. May 24.

To the Select Committee. May 26.

*In this letter I state to the Committee, as an additional reason for dispatch in the Southern force marching towards me, the news of an approaching peace, and the necessity of a combination of our whole force, to throw them at least many years back, before the official accounts of the peace in Europe could reach us.*

To the Select Committee. June 15.

To Mr. Sullivan. June 17.

*This Letter, and a Postscript of the evening, is the same as was sent to Colonel Fullarton. I had also occasion to inform both these Gentlemen that Monsieur*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Coleroon—The contents of that letter—My reasoning upon it—My determination to send the orders for co-operation in the way I understood to be the intentions of government in their resolution April 17th, unless they ordered to the contrary.

Concerns the debarkation of rice, &c. at Conjamere.

States my anxious expectation to receive a decided opinion upon the subject of my letter May 24th, before my giving further orders to Colonel Fullarton—Acquaints that the army would march, though all the rice were not landed at Conjamere; and that Captain Troubridge of the Active, at my request, was to proceed to Tranquebar with letters from me to Mr. Cochrane, to convoy what he had provided for the use of the army, being the only measure to come in aid to us, considering the delay of the Isis and her convoy arriving south of Cuddalore.

Narrative of the action of the 13th June—The receipt\* of this letter was never acknowledged, and no return of thanks to the brave army I had the honour to command.

Informing him of the instructions sent to Colonel Fullarton to come towards me, and of the preparations for the army necessary to be made by Mr. Sullivan; communicating the particu-

\* On a late inspection of my Papers, I find there is a bare acknowledgment from Lord Macartney to me, "that this Letter was received;" but no other notice was taken of it.

August, 1784.

J. S.

## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

*Suffrein had found means to get into Cuddalore Roads.*

Postscript to Colonel Fullarton.

June  $\frac{17}{18}$ .

*In this Postscript I state the necessity of a force being sent from Tanjore to Chillumbrum and Portonovo, because if the French Admiral should feed Monsieur Buffy's force in Cuddalore, our Admiral, by watering and receiving fresh provisions by the way of Chillumbrum and Portonovo, would be equally in the same way in condition to assist our operations against Cuddalore.*

To Colonel Fullarton.

June 17.

To the Admiral.

June 20.

*I had no answer to this letter.*

To Colonel Fullarton.

June 21.

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

lars of what passed betwixt the fleets off Cuddalore the 16th of June. Acquaints of all the provision and store-ships having left us; and therefore of the necessity there was to supply us immediately by the great rivers, and inland from the southward, and that I had also wrote earnestly for supplies to the Presidency.

Acquainting of Monsieur Suffrein, with his whole fleet, having got between our fleet and Cuddalore; and that, from the character of the man, I looked for the most spirited efforts from the combined force of the French—I repeat the immediate necessity of Colonel Fullarton's marching light and joining expeditiously; but that nothing should force me to quit my ground—On the whole, I state in spite of the then appearances, it might ultimately turn out for our advantage when the Admiral appeared.

Acquainting of Monsieur Suffrein having got into Cuddalore Roads; and positively ordering Colonel Fullarton to advance towards me.

Sent in three different directions to acquaint the Admiral that I had occupied Portonovo by two Bengal battalions, and that both there and at Chillumbrum there was entire safety and convenience for watering, and I could supply his fleet with fresh provisions.

To acquaint of having taken possession of Portonovo as well as Chillumbrum, and of the situation of things by land and sea.



## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

To the Select Committee. June 23.

*This letter deserves particularly to be attended to in this point of view; because from the intelligence of our situation conveyed to Colonel Fullarton, he wrote me, that though the Committee had sent him orders to re-cross the Colleroon (if he had passed it), and to act to the Southward, yet he took on himself to continue his movement towards me; so that in this case, even according to the most literal construction of the resolution in Committee April 17th, the leaving it to Colonel Fullarton's discretion and judgment, the co-operation was proper, and with the force he could spare.*

*This letter, and many others wrote at this critical time, will also most fully explain, why, consistent with every good principle, as well as in sound judgment, and the strictest duty of fidelity to the Honourable Company's interest and service, I could not withdraw or recall the orders given for Colonel Fullarton's marching towards me, even after I had received a letter from the Select Committee to that purpose; it arose from the exigency of our situation when abandoned by the fleet, and which could not have been known at the time when the letter was wrote by the Select Committee.*

*Here it is equally observable as at Permacoil, neither thanks nor acknowledgment in any respect, has ever been made me by the Select Committee for the service done in opportunely possessing Chillumbrum, the eve of the action of the 13th June, and strengthening it.*

*See my opinions of the importance of Permacoil and Chillumbrum.*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Acquaints of Monsieur Suffrein being at anchor in Cuddalore Roads with the whole French fleet—The state of the army—Their composure of mind, though having in front all the enemy's combined force by sea and land at half gun shot distance—Abandoned by our fleet—The consequent fatigue and constant duty of our army; and the increased necessity of Colonel Fullarton's quick move towards me—The strange style of Mr. Sullivan's letters to me at this precise time, for schemes of operations towards Erode and the Ghauts, and desiring reinforcements from our army for the purpose—I state my having sent two battalions to Portonovo, however little we could spare them, because of the pressing necessity to cover the watering of the fleet, and to supply fresh provisions to the Admiral on his return; and because no assistance had been sent for that end from Tanjore—States the great scarcity of rice and horse gram, and the urgent call for assistance in every respect from the Presidency; advising the ships to keep out at sea and to the southward—Acquaints that, for want of cash, it was impossible for me to perform a promise made to Mr. Cochrane of Star Pagodas 8000—That he had neither money nor credit to provide what offered for the army, even though the coast was clear.

## STATE OF FACTS AND PROOFS.

## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

To the Select Committee. June 25.

*No answer or acknowledgment, in return to this letter, was ever made to me or to the army\*.*

To the Select Committee. June 26.

*This day several officers shewed letters from the Southward, that Colonel Fullarton's force was ordered by the Select Committee not to join or co-operate with me.*

To the Select Committee. June 27.

*In this letter I inform the Select Committee, that if the reports were true, I must look on those answerable, who gave such counter orders; and that I should then, and at all times, in regard to my opinions and my orders, appeal to the records, to vindicate my conduct to my superiors.*

To the Select Committee. June 27.

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Account of the repulse of the French in their attempt upon our parallel.

It gives a particular account of our situation—Our total dependence upon the Presidency for supplies of every fort—The supplies from the southward not to be accounted for any thing in comparison—In daily expectation of another *sortie* from the French—Determination to strengthen the parallel and close the redoubts, and delay advancing our trenches, thus to conceal where our batteries were to be, until the Admiral returned, mean while to prepare materials of every fort.

States the reports that the Select Committee had sent orders to Colonel Fullarton to recross the Coleroon, if he had then passed to the north of it, and *not* to co-operate in the manner I had ordered—That my orders were positively countermanded; all which I told them I did not believe—States my having had no assistance of any sort from the Southern army, nor from Polygars of Warriore-Pollam, &c. nor even to garrison Chillumbrum.

No assistance from Tanjore to garrison Chillumbrum or Portonovo, and informs of my being in total ignorance of every thing to the southward, contrary to the rights of my station as the commander in chief of the Company's troops.

\* 1784. August—It is worthy of remark, that the President's Minute and Motion for my recall from the army are precisely of this date, 25th June 1783.



## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

To Colonel Fullarton.

June <sup>29.</sup>  
30.

To the Select Committee.

June 29.

To the Select Committee.

June 30.

*This letter is of the first consequence, to shew with precision the time when I received the very remarkable Letter, dated June 3d, from the Select Committee, where my conduct is blamed in a very singular style, but entirely unsupported by proofs. It will shew that it was impossible for them to know our situation at this time, which led me decidedly to decline recalling my orders to Colonel Fullarton.*

*That officer, on weighing all circumstances, and judging of the exigency of the case, did also march towards me, after receiving orders to the contrary from the Select Committee.*

*All this correspondence, and indeed every thing for two months and more since that period, has been in two or three conveyances sent and referred home to the Court of Directors. I have at all times given the reasons for every part of my conduct, attended with the written proofs and statements. My motives, in whatever I did in the command of the army,*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Mentions my extreme surprize on finding that all my letters *came to him so very late, contrary to the common rate of calculation*—Desires him to quicken his march—Acquaints of the French repulse the 25th; and that I expected *another sortie* of marine and land force with Monsieur Suffrein.

Expressing my surprize and disappointment in receiving no answer from Colonel Fullarton to the letters repeatedly wrote to him—And that the army was quite spent with fatigue.

Acquaints of my having, on the preceding day (June 29th) for the first time, received the letter of the Select Committee dated June 3d; it was a triplicate inclosed in *another* letter to me dated June 17th. I give my sentiments freely as to the contents of that letter June 3d, and of their commentary on my conduct. I stated the original necessity that had led me to order Fullarton's force from the southward, which necessity was manifold increased since, by the situation of the enemy, with *above ten thousand Europeans at half-gun shot from us*; a situation which precluded me from every idea of revoking or countermanding the orders given to Colonel Fullarton; and that I should stand to every consequence resulting from this apparent act of disobedience to their orders. I state my infinite surprize to find my letters on all occasions to arrive so late to Colonel Fullarton. Also state my plan to him on his advance towards me to encompass the whole of Seyd Sahib's force, and plunder, and

## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

*never could proceed from any improper cause; neither will I ever allow there was error in judgment on my part. Where or how am I to blame in this present alledged act of disobedience? Or what of my conduct in part, or take the whole, can possibly, by the most exaggerated straining and misrepresentation—What, I say, can be brought forward to open view, to justify or account for the proceedings in Select Committee September 17, 1783?*

To the Select Committee. July 1.

*This letter is of importance, to shew the state and disposition of the army, and of the French force, at this time; but more particularly to point out the day when I first received the Committee letter June 3d, which ordered the return of Colonel Fullarton, and countermanded my former orders to that officer. It was not till June 29th that I received this very remarkable letter. Let any candid person read it, and compare with the then situation of our affairs to judge of my conduct. Seyd Sahib's people had intercepted the former copies of this letter, June 3d, and sent them to Monsieur Buffy and Monsieur Suffrein. Monsieur Moissac, Captain of M. Suffrein's ship, sent a French translation of it to Capt. Dauvergne at Madras, which I sent a copy of to the records here. The sentiments even of our enemies concerning this letter are publicly known.*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Tippoo's Amildars, with the assistance from Permacoil. I state the repairs made at Chillumbrum by my orders, and only by Lieutenant Brickmyre\* and his two companies; mentions the seeing a strange frigate among the French fleet, supposed a cartel, but no intimation from Monsieur Buffy of its being so—States the immediate want of supplies of all sorts from the Presidency, and that we can have them nowhere else; and that 14 days only were remaining for the fighting men of the army—And my determination to run every risk, rather than give up one inch of ground so honourably, though dearly, maintained.

Acquaints of having received the most certain intelligence that the Admiral and the whole of our fleet were returned to Madras Roads. States my sentiments on the occasion, and the total dependancy of the army for supplies on the Presidency. The appearance of the *strange* frigate; and my not receiving any letters from the Presidency since the 27th of June (inclosing the triplicate of the letter June 3d), and yet there were letters in camp from Madras, mentioning that my letter, with the account of the action of the 13th of June, had been received, to which I had no answer.

\* See preceding note, June 23d.



## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

To Mr. Sullivan.

July 1.

*This strange ship turned out to be the Medea, Captain Gore, sent as a cartel with the extraordinary deputation from the Select Committee, composed of Mr. Sadlier, Second in Council, and George Leonard Staunton, private Secretary to Lord Macartney, who was in no shape in the service of the East India Company.*

*There were no accounts from that ship, or these deputies, or from Monsieur Buffy, until Mr. Sadlier came to camp, July 2d.*

General After-Orders to the army. July 2.

*Where, in all this proceeding, do I shew disobedience of the Orders of Government, though they were personally injurious to myself, if any fair construction is put on the word, and considering times, situation, and circumstances?*

To Monsieur Buffy.

July 3.

*This letter, as I recollect, was wrote the 2d, and I am not sure if it was not dated that day; but this I know, that in the same spirit that led me to publish the preceding After-Orders, I sent this letter, as the most ready way to comply with the Orders of Government, in what was essential as meant by their deputation, of*

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Acquaints of the best mode to send grain of all sorts towards Chillumbrum and Portonovo, both from Tanjore and the coast, for the use of the army, and out of danger of the French fleet—The news of the Admiral's return to Madras encreases the necessity of exertion in this way—My determination not to quit our advantageous ground on any consideration less than absolute famine—My dependence on the spirit of our army—Acquaints of the strange frigate amidst the French fleet.

These orders were issued by me on the precise day of Mr. Sadlier's arrival in camp, and after the verbal communication of his instructions, &c. It was done by me to avoid mistakes at the out-posts, or by the centinels firing, and to prevent confusion in the interim while the business was settling with my successor in the command (the Honourable Major General Bruce): It was also done, as I believe, and to the best of my recollection, even before the orders for my recall were published to the army in a most extraordinary manner, and before Major General Bruce had accepted of the command.

Communicating my orders for a cessation of hostilities to the army upon the report of Mr. Sadlier.

## LETTERS REFERRED TO.

*which I had only verbal information from Mr. Sadlier. Besides, I judged, that in my station as commanding in Chief his Majesty's troops, independent of any other situation, it was my duty, and altogether fit, on such an occasion, to correspond directly with Monsieur Buffy, the Commander in Chief of the French King's troops.*

*What is there in all this conduct on my part really exceptionable?*

To the Honourable Major General Bruce. July 4.

*I request this letter to be read with attention by any candid man, and to say what more could be required or expected of any person in the most strict obedience and conformity to Government, either as to the service of his Majesty, or of the Company's troops? The whole is here stated in my separate, and in some sort private, letter to General Bruce.*

To General Bruce. July 4.

*This and all my letters directed to the Honourable Major General Bruce, commanding the Carnatic army in the field.*

To Major General Sir John Burgoyne, Bart. July 6.  
commanding his Majesty's troops at the Presidency.

## ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Communicating Colonel Fullarton's letter and postscript of June 29th, and my sentiments on that head; also delivering over the command of the king's troops serving with the army then before Cuddalore; and recommending to General Bruce to regulate his conduct by the Orders of the Company's government.

Inclosing the copy of my letter to Monsieur Buffy, July 2<sup>d</sup>; and of his answer the 3<sup>d</sup>, and recommending to General Bruce to have a further written explanation with Monsieur Buffy.

In answer to a letter from Sir John Burgoyne; and describing the line I had pursued, and was determined to pursue, in obedience to the Company's government as my duty in one respect, but without affecting my situation as commanding his Majesty's forces; and that in consequence I had empowered



## STATE OF FACTS AND PROOFS.

27

### LETTERS REFERRED TO.

### ABSTRACT OF THEIR CONTENTS.

Major General Bruce to command that part of his Majesty's troops in the field.

To Colonel Fullarton.

July 6.

In answer to his letter of the 29th of June, and describing the situation of things, and that he was to obey Major General Bruce as his superior in what regards his Majesty's troops, to whom for the time I had made over the command of these troops; recommending, as my *private* advice to Colonel Fullarton, to take possession of Pallamcottah.

(Signed) JAM<sup>s</sup> STUART.

And now, in regard to what passed at the Council of War, July 1<sup>st</sup>/<sub>3</sub><sup>rd</sup>, where the Honourable Major General Bruce sat as President, and where I was present *only* to give my opinion in *deliberation* when *asked*, and from my situation as commanding the King's troops in camp; I am now most earnestly to call upon the attention of our Honourable Employers to observe the cause which gave rise to that Meeting, with the letters from the Select Committee to General Bruce, and the answers from that Officer accompanying the Proceedings, and the Correspondence after I left the field, and particularly to the Commissary's Return of Ordnance and Military Stores, which must have been delivered over to Monsieur Buffly, had General Bruce *literally* obeyed the Orders of this Government; the whole owing to the neglect at the Presidency, in not ordering to the army the Morse India ship (*which was ready loaded with rice*) the moment Government knew there was a cessation of hostilities agreed upon, and to bring off the military stores. The whole correspondence, until Major General Bruce,

from fatigue and vexation, fell sick, well deserves perusal, both as to the merits, and to shew in what manner the Select Committee judge of their own authority, and the General's duty, in the conducting of the public service to the best advantage.

And, to conclude, as to my remaining with my friends at the army until July 13th, it was truly owing, as every one knows, to my having no possible mode of returning, until I requested a passage with Captain Gore in the *Medea*.

(Signed) JAM<sup>S</sup> STUART.



## S U M M A R Y,

## TO SHEW

The Orders, under which I believed, in good Faith, that I acted consequent of the Resolution in Committee, April 17, 1783: Also shewing, in the Appendix, the Letters *not official*, to Colonel Lang and Colonel Fullarton, in March; and my Letter to the Secret Committee, March 21, in Explanation of my Conduct previous to the General Orders March 19th, noticed in the General Orders of the Select Committee September 17th last.

**I**N the plan of operations for the campaign against the French at Cuddalore, which I laid before the Committee April 8th, 1783; the co-operation of the force to the southward, with the army under my command, was made a most essential part of it; and I now refer to that plan.

In Committee April 17th, and also on reconsideration of the subject, that co-operation was agreed to and confirmed; and I most undoubtedly did declare at the time, and have since, in effect, most religiously kept up to the declaration, "That nothing but thorough conviction of the utility, and even indispensable necessity of the measure, would make me avail myself of the powers, to order the force from the southward towards me;" and it will accordingly be found in almost every letter

to

to the Committee, after moving from the Presidency (where the matter is spoke of), that I give notice of my reasons and determination, to order the Southern force towards the Coleroon.

I saw, in the truest point of view, what I communicated to Colonel Lang, April 20th; *not an Order*, as might be thought on the first reading of the letter of Committee to me, May 27th, but, as communicating to that officer, my *own* ideas on this most important subject, and as soon as possible. Whether my letter is dated April 18th or 20th, is of little moment; I had wrote to Colonel Lang to the same purpose, and as my *private opinion*, March 26th \* and 31st †, and to Colonel Fullarton, March 28th ‡. It was the duty of my station, in correspondence with officers in certain stations under my command, but *not* as Orders, or even as opinions contradictory to the sentiments or instructions of government: yet such has been the construction put upon it.

My wish to eradicate every degree of ill-founded suspicion from the minds of the Right Honourable President, &c. led me, of my own accord, to communicate to the Select Committee my correspondence concerning this co-operation, both of a separate or private, and of an official nature; supposing that the proper distinction would, by them, be made; which it would appear has not been the case.

However, I hope it will not escape observation, that in all my letters in April to Colonel Lang and Colonel Fullarton, I expressly recommend, by all means, *to carry on the objects they were then employed in, and by no means to quit them on account of the projected co-operation.*

Colonel Lang, with this foreknowledge of my sentiments, carried *Carroor, Averacouby, and Dindigul*; after which he resigned the command to Colonel Fullarton, and returned to the Presidency.

\* See Appendix, N° II.

† See Appendix, N° IV.

‡ See Appendix, N° III.



It was from that time (after the taking of Dindigul, May 4th), *that I anxiously looked for the movement of the Southern force* (in strength as mentioned in my letter April 20th, to Colonel Lang, and communicated to Colonel Fullarton), *towards the Coleroon*; and by a comparison of dates, when that place (Dindigul) fell, with what is stated in the letter from the French officer at *Bidenore*, to Monsieur Buffy, containing the particulars of the capture of *Hydernagar*, transmitted by me from Pondicherry to the Committee in the beginning of June, and which has since been found to be a true and genuine account of the business; I say, it will appear, that, *after the fall of Dindigul, there was no movement of the Southern force in any direction that could possibly operate to avert the misfortune at Bidenore*; and, judging by the common rules of policy and prudent conjecture, and from the nature and distance of the scenes of action, applicable to any *real* diversion of Tippoo's force from *Mangalore*, there was no more probable way, in my idea, to draw that force from that pursuit, than by encreasing the French apprehensions for their own safety, and applying their influence with Tippoo to come himself, or to send a sufficient force towards Cuddalore, *against which all our combined force was by my plan to operate.*

I ask, what, therefore, in common sense or prudence, remained for us to do, after the fall of Dindigul, and leaving the Southern provinces properly garrisoned and guarded, *other* than according to the plan before mentioned? and I add, to the spirit, and even the words, properly understood, of the Committee Resolution April 17th, "To move directly, and without delay, towards me."

When at last, and very late indeed, that very force arrived at Trichinopoly (June 16th), Colonel Fullarton, after being informed of the action of June 13th, and hearing from me and others of the situation of the French fleet, and united land and sea force at Cuddalore, and that we were abandoned by our own fleet, and upon my reiterated orders to move towards me; that officer, though *at the time* possessed of the letter

of the Select Committee, ordering him to move in a total contrary direction, yet with great propriety, from a sense of his real duty to that very Government which gave the orders, saw the matter in its true light, and made the movements towards me by my orders.

This shews clearly, what is the real public duty of an Officer of responsibility, intrusted with a command; and that in what Colonel Fullarton and I did, on this occasion; and indeed by the nature of all orders to officers of rank, at such distance from the seat of Government; the urgency of unexpected events must be the excuse for dispensing with the most positive orders of this, and of every Government, in order to avoid the greater evil; a conduct which, with every wise Government, will explain itself; and which, under no colour of propriety, of candour, or of justice, would be *construed into an act of disobedience*, but, on the contrary, be called truly meritorious.

(Signed) JAM<sup>S</sup> STUART.



# APPENDIX

## TO THE STATE of FACTS.

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### No. I.

Copy of a Letter \* from Major General STUART to the Right  
Honourable GEORGE Lord MACARTNEY, K. B. President  
and Governor, &c. Select Committee, Fort St. George.

My LORD, &c.

March 21, 1783.

**T**HIS morning at two o'clock, about an hour before leaving camp, your letter of yesterday, March 20th, reached me, inclosing the attested copy, by Mr. Huddleston, of the paper I signed in England, in common with every officer in the Company's service, which paper I left with the Adjutant General to publish in General Orders this day, to the army in the field, because it was *your Orders*; however unnecessary I may think such a publication, either to put me in mind of my duty, or as needed for the army I have the honour to command. It is happy for me, that the only instances which you can lay hold of, as a reason for this personal discipline on your part, are such, as when your superiors see my letters of the 14th and 15th, and your answer of the 20th, I have every reason to think that their decision will not be to my prejudice—and I appeal to it. Mean while, as the impu-

\* I am uncertain whether this was sent as a letter, or in circulation as my Minute 21st March, after my return to the fort from camp, and will appear on the records. There may be also some errors in the copying from the sketch in my hand; but the sense is entire.

Sept. 24, 1783.

(Signed) J. S.

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tation even of disobedience of the orders of Government sounds very disagreeable to me, I now state the fact.

The first instance where you say that strict and immediate obedience was to be paid by me to your orders, was in regard to the order in writing for 12,000 pagodas, directed to the paymaster for the use of the Bullock Maftries, which indeed you might have as well given at once to him without my leave, *your orders being paramount*, unless it was with some personal view, as at present to me; however in that note, and in the letter which covered it, you say, "That the clamorous Bullock Maftries were to be paid from the money stopped by Mr. Jackson for rice, &c. lodged with Mr. Welsh." I gave orders for that very money in two payments, amounting, *not to 12,000 pagodas, but to 8668 pagodas*, as appears by Mr. Welsh's letter to me, and now delivered to the Committee: I also returned the note to Mr. Welsh, and if there is a delay in fulfilling General Orders, or that your intentions are to give more than the amount of rice stopped, this delay, until further explanation, might in candour be construed as proceeding from a well-founded supposition, that *you* did not know the exact amount of the rice stoppages.—So much for that.

And as to the second and last instance, if it can be called disobedience, in any sense—my opinion and resolution concerning your appointment of Mr. Huddleston to be Judge Advocate General, I can only say, that *I obeyed your orders in that respect, as far as the publishing of them to the army.* But thinking, as I do, that you have not legally the power to give such an appointment so as to be efficient, without the sanction of his Excellency Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander in Chief of his Majesty's forces, I wrote on the 15th what I now repeat, "That Mr. Huddleston, " or his deputy, will " not be employed by my orders in that capacity," *because he cannot*; not from any disrespect or disobedience to the Company's government, but because I am clear, *that he nor no man can by law exercise the office, without the sanction of the Commander in Chief of his Majesty's forces.* And by way of general answer as to your power over me in any respect whatever, I can assure you, that no act, much less any threat, will ever induce me to do what I think disrespectful to his Excellency Sir Eyre Coote, as well as illegal.

*The preceding, copied, from necessity, by myself, is the transcript of the paper given to Government, March 21, 1783.*

(Signed) JAM<sup>S</sup> STUART.

*A true copy, see remark at the bottom, Page i.*

(Signed) JAM<sup>S</sup> STUART.

Sept. 24, 1783.



## N° II.

Copy of a Letter from Major General STUART to  
Colonel LANG.

## OBSERVATIONS.

March 26th, 1783.

*This separate letter to Colonel Lang will (as the other following) shew the clear idea I had of what the nature was to be of the Southern co-operation. I had neither indirect concealment or design; and had Colonel Lang continued in the command to the Southward, my firm belief is, that the junction would have been effected in proper time, and every expectation from the co-operation would have been realised. I mean, had the army moved North immediately after the reduction of Dindigul by him (Colonel Lang).*

*In this, as in the subsequent letter, it will clearly appear what were my wishes as to the speedy movement, contrary to the groundless assertions of intended procrastination, and other hard words, without any good meaning, in the President's Minutes.*

(Signed) J. S.

**I** Am here preparing in the utmost force and magazines to go to the southward, and yet when I come to Cuddalore I am not sure of above twelve days rice independent of the fleet. I speak from *myself*, without knowing precisely the plan of Government, and I write to you, as *Stuart to Lang*; my intention is to drive the French into the Sea, or into the interior parts of the Mysore country; and my *own plan* will be, to effect a junction with you for that purpose.—If you take *Carroor*, my *private* advice to you is to destroy it, and the stores, if they impede you, and bring away the provisions: I could have wished you to have spared troops to have possessed themselves of Chillumbrun and Palamcottah, and the Warriore-Pollam Man to be our friend, without placing troops in his country. If not too late, give every promise and protection to Hyder's people to put your troops in possession of these two places. In all events, be assured that the French, however numerous, are not a moveable body, and that I shall be with you before four weeks from the present date. I expect the General by that time, and I am sure we have but

one mind. Farewell—this is *private*, not *official*.

September 24, 1783. *The above is the exact copy of what I wrote to Colonel Lang of that date.*

(Signed) JAM<sup>s</sup> STUART.

### N<sup>o</sup>. III.

#### Copy of a Letter from Major General STUART to Colonel FULLARTON.

##### OBSERVATIONS.

*This is my separate private letter to Colonel Fullarton, then second in command to the Southward, next to Colonel Lang, and shews what I meant then, and uniformly afterwards. I give it entire, though not official, having not a wish or a word to be concealed. It is wrote in the same spirit as dictated the letters to Colonel Lang of March 26th and 31st, now in this Appendix.*

(Signed) J. S.

Dear SIR, March 28th, 1783.

I must be short and without compliment; I have wrote to Colonel Lang my own plan, but not *official*, to effect a junction with the southern army, to drive the French from the Coast in one way or another.—I shall move at the furthest in ten days hence; perhaps with twelve days rice.—After arriving at Cuddalore I trust to Colonel Lang's resources for more;—Our great plan is to *extinguish the French consequence for many years to come in this country; all inferior objects are in my idea laid aside.* If you take Carroor before that time, bring away or destroy all military stores or provisions, and blow up the place. I shall be happy to hear that we have taken possession of Chillumbrum and Pallamcottah, and that the Warriore-Pollam Man is our friend. The greater the number of Frenchmen



# APPENDIX, N° III.

under Monsieur de Buffry the better for us, in my opinion, considering their difficulties both in field and garrison. This is the substance of what I have written to Colonel Lang, as my *own* plan, and I believe it will be *official*. I give you joy of the Marrattah Treaty being exchanged and ratified the 24th of February; the fort and army fired upon the occasion, and I read an official account of it, signed by every member of the Supreme Board the 10th of March. Sir Eyre Coote does not leave Bengal till the 17th at soonest. The French cruizers, two ships of the line and two frigates, are still off here; I believe they are cruizing for the General, and for rice; but I trust that the Admiral will be round in time to save the General, by their quitting the station, or make them repent it if they stay until the second week of next month, before which time I do not expect Sir Eyre Coote will arrive.

(Signed) J. S.

N<sup>o</sup> IV.Copy of a Letter from Major General STUART to  
Colonel LANG.

## OBSERVATIONS.

*This is a separate private letter to Colonel Lang, to shew him what were my intentions by the co-operation of the Southern force. The delay in moving the army either from the Presidency after returning from Vellore, and the delay in marching from Permacoil are clearly accounted for, from the necessity of a store at Chingleputt, and the late arrival of the provision ships at Conjimere. My wishes and expectations of greater dispatch, appear from this private letter to Colonel Lang.*

SIR, March 31<sup>st</sup>, 1783.

I N ten days hence, whether the Admiral or the General arrives or not, I shall certainly move with this army to the Southward. It will be ten days more before I can get to Cuddalore. My intention (*I speak as a private man*) is to effect a junction with you, to drive the French either into the Sea or to the Mysore country, in either case it is equally advantageous to Britain.

If we can secure Chillumbrum, Pallamcottah, and the Warriore-Pollam Man, by hook or by crook, before I arrive, half the business will be done. If you take Carroor, destroy it, and the artillery and stores and provisions which you cannot bring away.—This is *Stuart to Lang*, not official, but as my private advice to you, and I will officially support it. Adieu.

*The above is a true Copy of what I wrote Colonel Lang of that date.*

(Signed) JAMs. STUART.



N<sup>o</sup> V.

My Remarks \* upon the President's Minute.

[It is the Minute of the President as such, that I remark upon in the margin.]

(Signed) J. S.

## REMARKS.

\* *I beg in candour to refer to the Minute of the Right Honourable President, June 25th, and on the very day that the brave army, which he never thanked, had repulsed the French combined force with Seyd Sabib's auxiliaries; and at the same time, refer to my Answer July 23d, so soon as I knew of this attack made behind my back.*

† *Treating this as the Minute of the President, it is a most ungenerous, malicious, and false allusion, calculated by him to serve the purpose of the day.—I defy him to adduce one single expression, much less any act on my part, tending to subvert Government, unless he makes Government to depend upon his personal closet lucubrations brought forth as Minutes, which, in free discussion in Select Committee, where it is supposed the Proceedings are not for publick eye, I have pretty constantly endeavoured to shew the futility of.*

The President's Minute, Sept. 17th, 1783 †.

In Committee, September 17, 1783.

THE President has the honour to observe to the Committee, that in his Minute of the 25th of June last, after mentioning some of the instances of misconduct and disobedience of Major General Stuart<sup>†</sup>, which made it necessary to recal him immediately from the command of the army, the President added, that upon the General's return he would have an opportunity of adducing his reasons, either to justify his misconduct, or to mitigate the punishment due to it. His conduct indeed appears to have been that of a premeditated, wilful, repeated and systematic disobedience; and that disobedience has been not only prejudicial, by its example, to the Company's regular government, and has a direct tendency to bring about<sup>‡</sup> the same subversion of such government as that of which the General has been, in a former instance, a principal and active instrument; but such disobedience has been actually productive of material and lasting in-

\* These Remarks, wrote on the margin of an exact Copy of Lord Macartney's Minute of 17th September 1783, made part of the Appendix which was delivered in by General Stuart to the Select Committee at Madras, on the 10th of October 1783.

† The President's Minute, as here printed, is an exact transcript from the official copy, which, though repeatedly asked for, was never given to General Stuart till the 25th of September 1783.

## REMARKS.

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<sup>2</sup> *The whole of this malevolent misrepresentation, with the antidote, has been referred home near a year ago.*

<sup>4</sup> *I refer to the Proceedings in Committee April 17th, and the Proofs in the preceding papers, to overturn this wilful misrepresentation.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ditto, ditto, as above.*

jury to the Company, in the instance of his not following the directions and intentions of the Select Committee<sup>3</sup>; and his consequent promise to have the army ready to march on all emergencies; which, immediately upon the death of Hyder Ally, and the absence of Tippoo, his Successor, from his army in the Carnatic, and the confusion in that army, might have long since terminated the war and desolation of the Carnatic by that Prince. In the instance of his abusing the discretion lodged in him for <sup>4</sup> calling a detachment of the Southern army, then essentially employed, in case of indispensable necessity; instead of which, he immediately, without any such, or even any pretence of such necessity, and exerting instantly the power to be exerted at any rate only in future, ordered the main body of that Southern army to join him in the Carnatic, declaring that such was the order of the Committee; by which means the operations of the Southern army were impeded, and Tippoo left at liberty to pursue, with success, his attacks against the Company's inferior army, and their exposed possessions on the other side of the peninsula, and for the obvious purpose of waiting for the junction of that southern<sup>5</sup> army, as he could have no pretence for it, if he marched quickly and succeeded without it; which he acknowledged the force already with him was fully equal to, and by such junction, of having the command of the whole, he procrastinated a



## REMARKS.

MINUTE, 17 SEPT. 1783.

\* *Yes! supposing I had wanted head or proper conduct, or had only followed Lord Macartney's Closet Theory!—Pray see the reasons for a different conduct, which at the moment are under the eyes of the very person who misrepresents it.*

† *The supposition of our being able to invest Cuddalore,—to deprive them of Provisions by land, or to have any chance to carry the place but from open trenches, is absolutely false and groundless. Had I run on upon this intercepted intelligence, it would have not only been acting contrary to every degree of proper attention to the main and grand object, and not to be risked by a Partisan Excursion; but by comparison of dates it will clearly appear, that there is next to a certainty, the Resolution transport and cargo, and the Active frigate, and even the grand convoy with the Isis, would have fallen into Monsieur Penier's hands, the French Commodore, who with two ships of the line and frigates convoyed the French provisions to Cuddalore, May 31st, or June 1st\*.*

‡ *The army was most undoubtedly left and abandoned by his Majesty's fleet.—The Admiral, doubtless, can explain why,—but we could have held out for any time, in common calculation, requisite to the Admiral to have watered, in sufficiency for the occasion, and returned to his station South of Cuddalore.*

§ *My opinion of the mode and the consequences of this extraordinary deputa-*

march to Cuddalore, that might be effected in twelve<sup>o</sup> days, to upwards of forty days; so that the opportunity was lost of attacking, and most probably defeating and taking, the French troops in that neighbourhood, when, according to the intercepted letters of their commander, the Marquis de Buffly, they were in want of provisions, and even of ammunition; and consequently, if even invested, would have been under the necessity of<sup>†</sup> surrendering themselves prisoners of war, instead of which, by such a wilful procrastination, the enemy had an opportunity of receiving provisions from the country, and ammunition by sea, and the enemy's squadron had time to arrive to the assistance of the land forces, which, after the retreat to Madras of his Majesty's fleet<sup>‡</sup>, and the communication by sea entirely cut off with the Company's army before Cuddalore, might have been productive of fatal consequences, if this Government<sup>§</sup> had not availed itself of the private accounts of the preliminaries of peace, to announce the same in form to the enemy, and to establish a cessation of hostilities. By

\* Quere. If these Dates in the Original?

## REMARKS.

tion to Cuddalore, especially as regarding the operations on the other coast, stands on record, and I refer to it.—All I now shall observe is, after the Deputies had negotiated their business, when I was excluded and recalled from the command of the army at Cuddalore, the next instantaneous object for the relief of that army for provisions, and to carry off the stores, should have been to have sent the Company's ship the *Morse*, and the not doing so brought on every subsequent distress.

<sup>10</sup> It is a malicious misrepresentation, and an absolute falsehood, that from my misconduct the French are now in such force in India.

<sup>11</sup> See the Resolution in Committee April 17th, concerning the co-operation of the Southern Army.—See my Orders and Letters in March and April, official and otherways, to Colonels Lang and Fullarton.—See my Letters to Colonel Fullarton after we were abandoned by the fleet, and for that reason, with such force in front of us, why I did not revoke the orders to Colonel Fullarton!

<sup>12</sup> See what I say on record, and in the preceding Papers on the subject of giving up the Command of the Army to the Honourable Major General Bruce, and the part I took as deliberative in the Council of War held in his Tent, July 1<sup>st</sup> 1783. Observe particularly the most disgraceful consequences which must have resulted from that Officer's literally obeying the Orders of the Select Committee, to march off and leave all our sick and wounded, and all the heavy stores, to the French

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this fatal misconduct <sup>10</sup> of Major General Stuart, the French are now in such force in India as may prove of much present embarrassment and future evil to the Company. General Stuart, in this misconduct, disobeyed the directions, and counteracted the intentions, of the Government. He declared he would send no positive orders for the junction of the Southern army <sup>11</sup>, without the concurrent sentiments of the Select Committee; but he did not only send such orders without such concurrence, but he sent them in direct contradiction of such sentiments. He expressly disobeyed Government in not instantly giving up <sup>12</sup> the command of the troops before Cuddalore. He acted as Commander in Chief, after the orders for his not doing so were actually published throughout the army. He did not immediately repair to the Presidency in obedience to the orders he received, but staid with the army, sat at a Council of War, misinformed and misled that Council of War, and gave a new example of disobedience, in retaining the detachment ordered to be sent to the Southward. His assumption of independent command in the fatal instances already quoted, has pervaded the whole system of his conduct, as in the case of orders to the Northward,



## REMARKS.

*protection; I beg leave to refer to the Letters to and from Major General Bruce, the Minutes of the Council of War, and that Officer's Letter transmitting the same; also his Answer to the Select Committee's Letter July 16th.*

<sup>13</sup> See my Plan for the defence of the Circars.

<sup>14</sup> I do not for my soul know what is meant by these words, "Expenditure of the public money."—I never had to do with the public money in any way, but as for intelligence and Secret Service, which, were I called on, I could account for to a trifle; indeed the whole sum, for nearly one year and four months that I commanded the army, is a mere trifle, compared, as I have heard, with the secret service-money in a certain civil line of Government.—As to the Bullock Mastries, or their stoppages, or their concerns, if the words refer to that, I can with great truth aver, I never had any knowledge or interference in any respect with Bullock Mastries of the Black Cast, or with the real masters of the White Cast, who squeeze the vitals of the Company, and absorb their resources under this dark cover, uncertain as to the extent of the Company's expence from the mode of managing the carriage of the army.—See what I say on the Bullock Men's stoppages in my Letter of March 21st. In a word, I never in my life derived either profit or perquisite of any sort consequent of any command in the army.—I never had to do with Bazar or Liquors, and no man to my knowledge laid or received any duty on things brought to camp.

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which might have lost the Circars <sup>13</sup>, which were indeed afterwards menaced by Monsr. Suffrein. In the case of the expenditure of the public money <sup>14</sup>, contrary to the express directions of the Select Committee. In the case of

## REMARKS.

<sup>15</sup> *The case of the Judge Advocate is fully stated in the preceding papers, and ought to cover with confusion those who make it a charge against me.*

<sup>16</sup> *A most malevolent and groundless misrepresentation! I employed the Adjutant General of the King's Troops, as the late Sir Eyre Coote did, on separate detail, interior management and returns to the War Office, who do not officially know the Adjutant General of the Company's troops, and I was directed by the former conduct, and the particular Orders of Sir Eyre Coote, my immediate superior in that line.*

<sup>17</sup> *Observe what I say in my Letter of October 3d, upon the whole of this crude, though premeditated act, originating with the President, and afterwards so implicitly adopted by Messrs. Sadlier, Davidson, and Williams, in Select Committee September 17th, and how much it is in contradiction to the Honourable Court of Directors General Letter January 11th, 1781, which Letter was withheld from me until seven hours after the Company's dispatches had been sent by his Majesty's Squadron, and of which dispatches I have not had the smallest information in what regards myself, nor of what the Select Committee have wrote to Bengal.*

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the appointment <sup>15</sup> of a Judge Advocate General, which was made by the Select Committee, under the express authority of instructions from the Court of Directors. In the case of employing to act as Adjutant General <sup>16</sup>, a person different from him, who had been appointed by Government, in order to have undue influence over the army, or a considerable part of them, and to be able to communicate orders to them without knowledge of Government. In the instance of publishing orders to the army, without a previous communication to the Governor, as directed by the Instructions 1774, and in various other cases in which the Committee have too strong a remembrance to render the detail necessary to them; but which shall be particularized in the Dispatches to the Court of Directors. This assumption of independent command, this deliberate and repeated guilt, leave no alternative to the Committee, but by preventing the continuance of them, or by becoming responsible for the evils to the Company, and all the distractions in this Government with which it is at present threatened, and of which a continuance of his command might be productive. The President therefore moves, that in virtue <sup>17</sup> of the power given to the Government, in case of the disobedience of any of its military officers, that Major General Stuart be immediately dismissed from the service; and as his rank in the King's service can operate only when on service by the King's com-



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mand; and not being so employed, and being only on half-pay from the bounty of the Crown, and not employed by the Company, Major General Burgoyne, the senior Officer in the King's service upon the coast is consequently to command the King's Forces.

A true Copy.

(Signed) W. E. WASEY,  
Dep. Sec.

## N° VI.

The following Paper was wrote by me, given in for Record, and Read.

(Signed) J. S.

In Committee, Sept. 17th, 1783.

THE nature of this Minute \* from the President, and the motion consequent of it, is such, not only to me personally, but to the regular good order of this, and of all governments, and [so repugnant †] to the Instructions of the Company in the constitution of this Committee, that I request the Committee to defer passing sentence, or giving an opinion, until I can have a copy of both Minute and Motion, and to make answer, which shall not be delayed—Meanwhile, I will obey their decision, be it what it may, *only* in so

\* See preceding Minute, 17th September.

† Quere. If [so repugnant] was in the hurry inserted.

far as the Committee have powers legally and clearly, or as corresponding to the Company's Instructions.

(Signed) J. S.

*Requests to have the Copy of Minute and Motion.*

*Determined first to consider of it.*

*The above is a true Copy, to the best of my recollection, except the words in the Foot Note, perhaps omitted in the burry.*

(Signed) JAM<sup>s</sup>. STUART.

Fort St. George,  
17th Sept. 1783.

*The above is the Copy of the Minute I with difficulty could get on the Records, after the Select Committee had refused to hear me, or to delay proceeding to a decision.*

(Signed) JAM<sup>s</sup>. STUART.

**T**HE Letters by me to the Select Committee in the Company's Records, and to which I chiefly refer from the time of the Committee [September 17th], and the illegal seizure and imprisonment of my Person on that Day, were of the following dates:

|                                  |   |          |                          |
|----------------------------------|---|----------|--------------------------|
| From me to the Select Committee, | - | Sept. 18 |                          |
| Do.                              | - | -        | 19                       |
| Do.                              | - | -        | 22                       |
| Do.                              | - | -        | 25                       |
| Do.                              | - | -        | 28                       |
| Do.                              | - | -        | 30                       |
| Do.                              | - | October  | 2                        |
| Do.                              | - | -        | 3                        |
| Do.                              | - | -        | 5                        |
| Do.                              | - | -        | 7 Inclosing the Protest. |



## N° VII.

Affidavit of Major GRATTAN, taken before the Mayor of Madras, September 23, 1783. Copied from the Original, in my possession.

(Signed) J. S.

THIS evening, [September 17th, 1783,] about Seven o'clock, or a little before that hour, General Stuart, Major Grattan, and Lieutenants Close and Smart, being employed in writing and receiving orders from the General at his Garden House; Lieutenant Gomond, Fort Adjutant of Madras, and Mr. George Leonard Staunton, a gentleman of no certain note, rank, or description either in his Majesty's or the Company's service, abruptly entered the room in which they were sitting thus employed.

The Fort Adjutant first advancing to the General, by a verbal message announced to him his being put under an arrest by order of the Governor and Select Committee; adding, that the General must immediately accompany him into the Fort.

General Stuart replied, That he should certainly pay all due obedience to the orders of Government, but that he should require some time at least to secure his papers and put on his clothes, and time for this he should certainly take.

Lieutenant Gomond answered, That if he did not come with him voluntarily, he must use force, and had ready below for that purpose a party of sepoys. Mr. Staunton and Lieutenant Gomond on this whispered together, and the former instantly returning either down the stairs or to the head of them, introduced (himself stepping out in front of them) a party of sepoys with fixed bayonets, commanded by Lieutenant Cook; and he, Mr. Staunton, having immediately, with a violent and menacing motion, drawn his sword, Major Grattan approaching him, asked, Whether it was proper or decent to enter the apartment of the Commander in Chief with such an apparent indication of intended outrage? Mr. Staunton replied very loudly and intemperately, *That he knew what he did, and would answer for it.*

The General again demanded time to dress himself, being then, through the extreme heat of the evening, very loosely and thinly dressed, and to put up the papers on which he had been employed. So very little time, through the unremitting and pressing applications of the above-mentioned Gentlemen, was allowed for these purposes, that in the space of about ten or twelve minutes from the beginning, the General having first demanded under what description Mr. Staunton appeared there, or who he was? To which the only reply made was, *My name is George Leonard Staunton*; and the General having further required from Lieutenant Gomond with what authority he was invested, or whether he had any written order? To which Lieutenant Gomond replied, *He had verbal orders, which were sufficient to him*; the General concluded, that though he would not resist the regular powers of Government, yet in the present case, and under these circumstances, he did not think himself bound to go voluntarily from his house, where he was then doing business, and should therefore be moved only by force. On this Lieutenant Gomond seized the General by the arm, as he leaned on the couch and his crutch, and the General still resisting, and calling on all present to witness the force that was used against him, "Major General Stuart, his Majesty's Commander in Chief in India, and, according to that day's orders of Government, *not in the service of the Company.*" Lieutenant Gomond took out two Sepoys, and giving each an arm of the General, they carried him off to the stairs, where placing him in a chair, they conveyed him down to his palanquin, in which he was escorted by the party towards the fort.

It may be necessary to add, *that no Order had been at this time issued to his Majesty's troops* by General Stuart, nor was there a single man of those troops, either as centry or otherwise, then near the General.

(Signed) J. GRATTAN.

Fort St. George, Sept. 23, 1783.

Madraspatnam, *scil.* John Grattan, Esquire, Major in his Majesty's hundredth regiment of Foot, maketh oath, and saith, That to the best of his belief, knowledge, and recollection, the above narration is a just and true relation of the transactions therein mentioned.

(Signed) J. GRATTAN.

Sworn to before me, this  
23d September 1783,

(Signed) WM. WEBB, Mayor.



## CONTENTS of the APPENDIX.

|      |       |   |
|------|-------|---|
| Page | i.    | My Letter or Minute to the Select Committee, March 21st, 1783.  |
|      | iii.  | My Letter to Colonel Lang, - - - March 26th, Do.  |
|      | iv.   | My Letter to Colonel Fullarton, - - - March 28th, Do.   |
|      | vi.   | My Letter to Colonel Lang, - - - March 31st, Do.  |
|      | vii.  | The Right Honourable President's Minute of September 17th, Do.<br>With my Observations on the Margin, - - October 10th.   |
|      | xiii. | My Minute in Committee, - - - Sept. 17th, Do.   |
|      | xiv.  | Dates of Letters from me to the Select Committee, from Sept.<br>18th, to October 7th.— <i>On which Day I transmitted to them my<br/>Protest and Declaration in form, upon their Proceedings towards<br/>me; this Packet was delivered to Lord Macartney by Mr. Close, in<br/>the Forenoon of the 7th Instant.</i> |
|      | xv.   | Affidavit of Major Grattan, taken before the Mayor of Madras,<br>Sept. 23d, 1783.   |

(Signed) JAMs. STUART.

# CONTENTS of the APPENDIX

1. The first part of the Appendix contains a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the Government since the year 1800.

2. The second part contains a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the Government since the year 1800.

3. The third part contains a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the Government since the year 1800.

4. The fourth part contains a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the Government since the year 1800.

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